EDITOR'S note:

The traumatic war in 1894 between China and Japan has cast a longer shadow than many people think. Today there is a vast body of research on the war and its legacy.

How do Japanese view the war and the imperial Chinese troops? Is there some reflection on the war, which is a signficant step in the run-up to Japan's future militaristic trajectory?

Shanghai Daily reporter Ni Tao interviewed Harada Keiichi about these issues. Harada is professor of Japanese history at Bukkyo University in Kyoto, Japan and an authority on the Japan-Qing War.

The phrases Japan-Qing War and the War of Jiawu are freely interchanged throughout the article. Shanghai Daily intern Wang Xiaolin helped with translation from the Japanese.

SD: How does your book “Nisshin Senso” differ from similar works on the subject?

Harada: In “Nisshin Senso” (Yoshikawakobunkan, 2008), I tried to unearth the truth and nature of the war. In fact, even students majoring in history are quite unfamiliar with the Japan-Qing War, which in effect was the combination of four campaigns.

First, Japan’s war with Korea, namely, the war that was started on July 23 by Japanese attempts to occupy the Chosun (Korea) Imperial Palace and hijack the king. The incident left four dead — one Japanese, three Koreans;

Second, the War of Jiawu in a narrow sense, i.e. military rivalry;

Third, the suppression of Korea’s Donghak peasant revolt, which was part of the whole war in another theater;

Fourth, conquest of Taiwan.

Japanese Supreme Headquarters, headed by Emperor Meiji, were set up on June 6, 1894 (in Tokyo’s royal palace) and dissolved on April 1, 1896 (not 1895 as is generally considered). In my humble opinion, this period is the exact duration of the War of Jiawu in its entirety.

I wrote another book entitled “Japan-Qing War & Russo-Japanese War” (Iwanami Shotan, 2007), which is part of a 10-volume series on Japan’s modern history. It is a chronology of Japanese society between 1890 and 1910. My arguments about the war are the same in both books.

SD: How did the war reparations from China contribute to Japanese modernization?

Harada: War reparations from the Qing empire were spent almost entirely on Japan’s military build-up. Only 2 percent went to education. Payments were then made to such nations as Britain and America to buy ships and enlarge the Japanese Navy. The war reparations were acquired in the form of gold in London and deposited in the Bank of England. This reserve of gold was the basis for Japan’s switch to gold standard from silver standard in 1899. Japan’s industry and trade had since benefited from this change of monetary standard. It goes without saying that the war reparations were a boon to Japan’s industrial development.

SD: Despite its defeat, China’s Beiyang Fleet outperformed its ragtag army. Is the disparity a result of the navy and army’s different levels of modernization?

Harada: The Beiyang Fleet was a great fleet. Its commander and captains were either cadets of foreign military academies or had studied in domestic naval academies that hired Westerners as instructors. They were all outstanding officers. They fought bravely for their motherland in the Naval Battle of the Yellow Sea, which was well documented by the hired Western crew members. Their valor was also recorded in great detail in my book “Nisshin Senso.”

As for the army, while it ostensibly fought in the name of the imperial Qing army, several detachments were actually the private troops of Li Hongzhang (Ed: the Huai Army). His troops, however, wasn’t fully integrated into the nation’s army. It was, so to speak, the officers’ different commitment and capabilities that made a difference.

SD: How do Japanese scholars comment on the Beiyang Fleet’s performance, especially Admiral Ding Ruchang, captains Liu Buchan and Deng Shichang, who died for the country?

Harada: There is a widespread false notion in Japanese academia and society that the Beiyang Fleet was beaten hands down. Nonetheless, there are exceptions. For instance, the story of Admiral Ding refusing to surrender to Japanese commanders who persuaded him to capitulate and of his committing suicide has lived on as a legend.

SD: The defeat of the Beiyang Fleet can be blamed, in large part, on the drying up of financing on naval development after 1888, which was a result of infighting in the Qing court. Therefore, is it arbitrary to blame the defeat squarely on corruption?

Harada: Until today, there is still a theory popular among researchers of the War of Jiawu, saying that the money earmarked for purchase of shells was embezzled by the Empress Dowager to build and repair the Summer Palace. The consequences were a lack of ammunition for the Beiyang Fleet. This does afford a glimpse into the corruption then.

SD: In the eyes of Japanese historians, what is the fundamental reason behind Japan’s victory over China? Is the war a judgment that Meiji Restoration succeeded where Yangwu Movement failed?

Harada: In my view, both China and Japan lost the war. Japan’s victory was a Pyrrhic victory. The definition of the War of Jiawu in a narrow sense is the military confrontation between China and Japan. The Qing empire lost by negotiating and signing an unequal treaty. But because of the war that started on July 23 (Japanese troops seized Gyeongbokgung, the seat of power of the Chosun Kingdom), and the subsequent repression of the Donghak peasant rebellion, Japan’s ties with the Korean populations plunged to their lowest point. These incidents led to Japanese minister’s assassination of Empress Myeongseong in 1895. It was the intention of then Prime Minister Ito Hirobumi and Foreign Minister Mutsu Munemitsu to exclusively enjoy the spoils of war and prevent intervention of Western powers in Korea. But finally a third power (Ed: Russia) emerged and entered the fray. So Japan lost on the diplomatic front.

In terms of the war as a military showdown, Japan’s victory was a result of the stark contrast between the piecemeal Yangwu Movement and true Westernization and cultural openness of Japan in the post-Meiji era.

SD: The Japan-Qing War was of great significance to Japanese history. But relatively little mention is made of it in Japan today. Does that have anything to do with the post-war bans on glorifying remnants of militarism?

Harada: I don’t think it has anything to do with the post-war order.

After the Japan-Qing War broke out, author Izumi Kyoka wrote the two novels of “Kaijyou Hatsuden” (“Telegraph from Haicheng”) and “Yobihei” (“The Reservist”). So the war became a literary subject. From then on, literary works on the Russo-Japanese War were also published successively. This was a product of growing nationalist feelings, of the impression that Japanese as a yellow race beat white men. Vestiges of the war still persist in contemporary Japan, where numerous films about the Russo-Japanese War were shot in the 1950s and 1960s. Writer Shiba Ryotaro’s “Saka no Ue no Kumo” (“Clouds Over the Slope”) also features the Russo-Japanese War as its theme.

SD: Japanese once referred to the Japan-Qing War as a struggle of “civilization versus barbarity.” Now there is some reflection on this argument. What is your view?

Harada: The argument was first made by Fukuzawa Yukichi (Ed: famous Japanese Enlightenment thinker who advised Japan to turn its back on Asia and embrace Europe) in an editorial published in the newspaper “Jiji-Shinpo.” But civil activist and thinker Yasukawa Etsuko had vehemently criticized Fukuzawa’s imperialist stance on East Asian affairs. I am in favor of his critical perspective.

SD: The war inflicted enduring pains on China. What lessons can we learn from the war?

Harada: The war could have been avoided. But Japan at the time had gone amuck and turned the war into a major conflict. Li Hongzhang’s attempts at a peaceful resolution failed. He didn’t succeed in getting the international community involved to prevent the war. In my view, the international community that is unable to stop the ongoing Israeli air strikes against Gaza can hope to bring the conflicts to an end only by having all the stakeholders and neutral parties work together. The world today is no longer stuck in the age of Japan-Qing War or Russo-Japanese War. These two wars have a lesson to teach the world, in that both neutral countries and stakeholders in the Middle Eastern conflicts ought to do their best to restore peace.

SD: Has China’s commemoration of the 120th anniversary of the War of Jiawu triggered any echoes in Japan?

Harada: Twenty years ago, I attended the international symposium that marked the 100th anniversary of the War of Jiawu, held by Shandong Academy of Social Sciences. I also visited the Liugong Island. (Ed: the harbor where the Beiyang Fleet was born and annihilated.) This year there was also a symposium in China, but I didn’t attend because of a busy schedule. Before that there was also a seminar during the 110th anniversary. China has attached great importance and showed unremitting respect to this chapter of history.

In comparison, there was also a symposium, organized by Japanese Association of Modern East Asian History, on the 100th anniversary of the war. But none was held this year. Japan’s reaction to the war is not as strong as that of China.

These days I have talked to both Chinese and South Korean media about the war. But Japanese media showed little interest. Because of the war, I have links with other Asian countries, but sadly the seeds of friendship haven’t been sown. I still believe that Japan’s imperialist expansion and aggression is a miserable development.