In this age of information overload, as average citizens are busy devouring, or churning out, bits and pieces of information, it is rewarding to be reminded how disinformation and manipulation have taken over the digital ecosystem.

The current crisis in Ukraine would be a compelling case, suggesting how easily public discourse in the West is being manipulated to prioritize particular messages.

Sobering voices do exist, as articulated by the following figures, though such voices are not generally getting the kind of attention they deserve.

This selective perception of public opinion can be politically motivated.

It is also dictated by data giants鈥� craving for clicks, as hate, extremism, and blood sell, which can be closely surveiled, priced, and marketed to advertisers.

In his 鈥淭oday鈥檚 Crisis Over Ukraine,鈥� published on 鈥淎CURA鈥� on February 14, Jack F. Matlock, 92, explains why this is an avoidable crisis that was predictable, willfully precipitated, and could easily be resolved by the application of common sense.

His appeal for common sense went unheeded.

Matlock served as the US ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1987 to 1991.

He said that 鈥渋t seems most likely that President Putin鈥檚 goals are what he says they are 鈥� and as he has been saying since his speech in Munich in 2007. To simplify and paraphrase, I would sum them up as: 鈥楾reat us with at least a modicum of respect. We do not threaten you or your allies, why do you refuse us the security you insist for yourself?鈥欌��

Putin demands that the process of adding new members to NATO cease and that, in particular, Russia has assurance that Ukraine and Georgia will never be members.

Given Putin鈥檚 demand, obviously there would have been no basis for the present crisis if there had been no expansion of NATO in the wake of the Cold War, or if the expansion had occurred in harmony with building a security structure in Europe that included Russia.

The former diplomat explained, based on personal experience, why Russian demand makes sense in light of US history.

鈥淎nybody remember the Monroe Doctrine, a declaration of a sphere of influence that comprised an entire hemisphere? And we meant it!鈥�

More pertinent was the Cuban Missile Crisis, which happened while Matlock was at the American Embassy in Moscow and translated some of Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev鈥檚 messages to Kennedy.

鈥淐uba was a sovereign state and had the right to seek support for its independence from anywhere it chose. It had been threatened by the United States, even an attempt to invade, using anti-Castro Cubans. It asked the Soviet Union for support. Knowing that the United States had deployed nuclear weapons in Turkey, a US ally actually bordering on the Soviet Union, Khrushchev decided to station nuclear missiles in Cuba. How could the US legitimately object if the Soviet Union was deploying weapons similar to those deployed against it?鈥� Matlock asked.

The Joint Chiefs recommended taking out the missiles by bombing, though Kennedy stopped short of that, declaring a blockade and demanding the removal of the missiles.

Matlock learned years later how close 鈥渨e鈥� had come to a nuclear exchange. He learned that, if the sites had been bombed, the officers on the spot could have launched the missiles without orders from Moscow. 鈥淚t was a close call. It is quite dangerous to get involved in military confrontations with countries that have nuclear weapons. You don鈥檛 need an advanced degree in international law to understand that. You need only common sense,鈥� Matlock warned.

In 1997, when the question of adding more members to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was raised, and Matlock was asked to testify before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he made the following statement: 鈥淚 consider the Administration鈥檚 recommendation to take new members into NATO at this time misguided. If it should be approved by the United States Senate, it may well go down in history as the most profound strategic blunder made since the end of the Cold War.鈥�

The reason he cited was Russia鈥檚 nuclear arsenal that 鈥渕atched if not exceeded鈥� that of the United States, and the fact that 鈥渢he plan to increase the membership of NATO fails to take account of the real international situation following the end of the Cold War, and proceeds in accordance with a logic that made sense only during the Cold War.鈥�

鈥淲hile there was no reason to enlarge NATO after the Soviet Union recognized and respected the independence of the East European countries, there was even less reason to fear the Russian Federation as a threat,鈥� Matlock wrote.

After the September 11 attacks, President Putin was the first foreign leader to call President Bush and offer support. Matlock observed that it was clear at that time that Putin aspired to a security partnership with the United States.

鈥淎s President Putin pulled Russia out of the bankruptcy that took place in the late 1990s, stabilized the economy, paid off Russia鈥檚 foreign debts, reduced the activity of organized crime, and even began building a financial nest egg to weather future financial storms, he was subjected to what he perceived as one insult after another to his perception of Russia鈥檚 dignity and security.鈥�

Then Senator Joseph Biden, during his candidacy for the presidential election in 2008, pledged to 鈥渟tand up to Vladimir Putin!鈥�

鈥淪o far as Ukraine is concerned, US intrusion into its domestic politics was deep 鈥� to the point of seeming to select a prime minister. It also, in effect, supported an illegal coup d鈥檈tat that changed the Ukrainian government in 2014, a procedure not normally considered consistent with the rule of law or democratic governance,鈥� Matlock wrote.

During President Obama鈥檚 second term, his rhetoric became more personal, with allegations like 鈥淩ussia makes nothing anybody wants,鈥� conveniently ignoring the fact that the only way for American astronauts to get to the international space station at that time was with Russian rockets.

Matlock said that President Putin鈥檚 demand for an end to NATO expansion and the creation of a security structure in Europe that insures Russia鈥檚 security along with that of others is eminently reasonable.

鈥淭o try to detach Ukraine from Russian influence 鈥� the avowed aim of those who agitated for the 鈥榗olor revolutions鈥� 鈥� was a fool鈥檚 errand, and a dangerous one,鈥� Matlock concluded.

At the time of writing the article, Matlock remained hopeful, but was later disappointed.

Sharing Matlock鈥檚 disappointment was Former Democratic Rep. Tulsi Gabbard, who tweeted on February 24 that 鈥淭his war and suffering could have easily been avoided if Biden Admin/NATO had simply acknowledged Russia鈥檚 legitimate security concerns regarding Ukraine鈥檚 becoming a member of NATO, which would mean US/NATO forces right on Russia鈥檚 border.鈥�

Appearing on a TV network earlier, she observed that 鈥淧resident Biden could end this crisis and prevent a war with Russia by doing something very simple: Guaranteeing that Ukraine will not become a member of NATO 鈥� because if Ukraine became a member of NATO, that would put US and NATO troops right on the doorstep of Russia, which, as Putin has laid out, would undermine their national security interests.鈥�

Nor does this realization elude observers like Thomas Friedman, who, in his article 鈥淲e Have Never Been Here Before鈥� (February 25, The New York Times) pointed to the balance of power that he feels was imposed on Russia after the Cold War.

鈥淭hat balance 鈥� or imbalance in Putin鈥檚 view 鈥� was the humiliating equivalent of the Versailles Treaty鈥檚 impositions on Germany after World War I. In Russia鈥檚 case, it meant Moscow having to swallow NATO鈥檚 expansion not only to include the old Eastern European countries that had been part of the Soviet Union鈥檚 sphere of influence, like Poland, but even, in principle, states that were part of the Soviet Union itself, like Ukraine,鈥� Friedman wrote.