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Challenge of grasping much-touted 'China Model'
By Ni Tao |
November 13, 2010, Saturday
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Print Edition
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OF all the buzzwords associated with China's meteoric rise, the "China Model" has long been the Loch Ness monster of academia. Some claim to have seen it, but cannot prove it exists. Others dispute or deny outright its existence.
Given my experience at the 4th World Forum of China Studies, held in Shanghai over the past weekend, it appears that this existential myth won't be cleared up anytime soon, as scholars remain befuddled about the form, meaning and staying power of this so-called "model."
Scholars speaking at a seminar on the "China Model" sounded as though they were speaking about totally different matters. No clash of opinions ensued as expected.
This was when I realized that the currency the term "China Model" has gained could obscure our true understanding of it. Rarely have we seen it summarized in less than 100 plain, accessible words.
The problem is due, in part, to the fact that the "China Model," like other buzzwords that came before it, was foisted by the West upon China to lull the awakening giant to complacency. And sadly we have made no serious attempts to resist, but readily accepted it as hard-earned kudos.
Although openly lauding China's development as a "miracle," the West remains wary of a distinct and alien growth model that outshined it during the economic crisis.
China's success story has elicited a torrent of unlikely praise. For instance, Washington Post columnist David Ignatius wrote in the immediate aftermath of the Wall Street debacle that "We are all Chinese now."
By "We are all Chinese now," he meant that the Western economic model, or specifically the Washington Consensus - which encompasses such principal elements as laissez-faire capitalism, the least state intervention in the economy, and massive privatization - had blundered badly because the US exercised little oversight over the Wall Street's excesses.
By contrast, Chinese government's active intervention in the economy is the key to its resilience. As a result, Westerners have come around to the notion that a certain dose of state intervention is necessary.
Hence the notable fact that discussion of the "China Model" gained steam during the height of the crisis.
The term is not a newfangled one, but dates back to the term "Beijing Consensus" coined by Joshua Cooper Ramo to describe China's distinct development path.
Ramo couldn't have meant as a compliment what he called the "Beijing Consensus," which is anathema to all things the Washington Consensus holds dear.
"Although the 'China Model' may exist, there is no such thing as a 'Beijing Consensus,'" said Yu Sui, a researcher at the Institute of Contemporary China Studies, at the China study forum last weekend.
Yu argued that Ramo's "Beijing Consensus" is as hyperbolic as the Washington Consensus, since "all the nations' development shares something in common but each is essentially unique."
Having been stuck with the thankless label of "World's Factory," China used to offer no more than cheap labor and products to the world.
To some, China's rise as an intellectual phenomenon can be acknowledged only if it is capable of exporting its development theory. It finally found one in the "China Model."
Mixed feelings
The tricky part is that "model" suggests something to be emulated and replicated. For China, however, its "model" generates mixed feelings.
Although the "China Model" is indeed closely studied in the developing world, it has stirred much controversy at home, said Zhao Sikong, a researcher at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences.
Zhao's argument is plausible, since a spate of suicide jumps plagued Foxconn's Shenzhen plant throughout April and May, while labor unrest broke out at two Honda factories in China.
Although calm and order was quickly restored there following pay raises, and workers had since returned to their roles of tiny cogwheels on a giant corporate machine, the simmering discontent suggests cracks are appearing in the once monolithic "model."
Foxconn easily outmaneuvered its detractors - and made them regret their vehemence - by moving its operations further inland, where labor is even cheaper.
This raises the uncomfortable question: What does the much-hyped industrial upgrade mean for China? Is it all about the relocation of businesses due to rising costs, Shi Anqing, a researcher with the World Bank, asked provokingly.
If so, China's "model" is no more than a travesty of the "flying geese paradigm" that's behind the catching-up process of industrialization of latecomer economies and the cascade of Asian economic take-offs, led by the "head goose" Japan and followed by South Korea, Singapore and some southeast Asian economies.
China finds itself at the end of the gaggle.
Inside China, if we compare its provinces to individual states, the "flying geese paradigm" applies as well - but with caveats. No evidence of genuine industrial overhaul is so far within sight. The void left by Foxconn isn't being filled by more sophisticated replacements. Some local governments simply block suicide news to shield their major revenue contributors from further criticism.
If the vaunted "China Model" cannot even rid itself of the "sweatshop" stain at home, what's the haste about promoting it overseas?
Given my experience at the 4th World Forum of China Studies, held in Shanghai over the past weekend, it appears that this existential myth won't be cleared up anytime soon, as scholars remain befuddled about the form, meaning and staying power of this so-called "model."
Scholars speaking at a seminar on the "China Model" sounded as though they were speaking about totally different matters. No clash of opinions ensued as expected.
This was when I realized that the currency the term "China Model" has gained could obscure our true understanding of it. Rarely have we seen it summarized in less than 100 plain, accessible words.
The problem is due, in part, to the fact that the "China Model," like other buzzwords that came before it, was foisted by the West upon China to lull the awakening giant to complacency. And sadly we have made no serious attempts to resist, but readily accepted it as hard-earned kudos.
Although openly lauding China's development as a "miracle," the West remains wary of a distinct and alien growth model that outshined it during the economic crisis.
China's success story has elicited a torrent of unlikely praise. For instance, Washington Post columnist David Ignatius wrote in the immediate aftermath of the Wall Street debacle that "We are all Chinese now."
By "We are all Chinese now," he meant that the Western economic model, or specifically the Washington Consensus - which encompasses such principal elements as laissez-faire capitalism, the least state intervention in the economy, and massive privatization - had blundered badly because the US exercised little oversight over the Wall Street's excesses.
By contrast, Chinese government's active intervention in the economy is the key to its resilience. As a result, Westerners have come around to the notion that a certain dose of state intervention is necessary.
Hence the notable fact that discussion of the "China Model" gained steam during the height of the crisis.
The term is not a newfangled one, but dates back to the term "Beijing Consensus" coined by Joshua Cooper Ramo to describe China's distinct development path.
Ramo couldn't have meant as a compliment what he called the "Beijing Consensus," which is anathema to all things the Washington Consensus holds dear.
"Although the 'China Model' may exist, there is no such thing as a 'Beijing Consensus,'" said Yu Sui, a researcher at the Institute of Contemporary China Studies, at the China study forum last weekend.
Yu argued that Ramo's "Beijing Consensus" is as hyperbolic as the Washington Consensus, since "all the nations' development shares something in common but each is essentially unique."
Having been stuck with the thankless label of "World's Factory," China used to offer no more than cheap labor and products to the world.
To some, China's rise as an intellectual phenomenon can be acknowledged only if it is capable of exporting its development theory. It finally found one in the "China Model."
Mixed feelings
The tricky part is that "model" suggests something to be emulated and replicated. For China, however, its "model" generates mixed feelings.
Although the "China Model" is indeed closely studied in the developing world, it has stirred much controversy at home, said Zhao Sikong, a researcher at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences.
Zhao's argument is plausible, since a spate of suicide jumps plagued Foxconn's Shenzhen plant throughout April and May, while labor unrest broke out at two Honda factories in China.
Although calm and order was quickly restored there following pay raises, and workers had since returned to their roles of tiny cogwheels on a giant corporate machine, the simmering discontent suggests cracks are appearing in the once monolithic "model."
Foxconn easily outmaneuvered its detractors - and made them regret their vehemence - by moving its operations further inland, where labor is even cheaper.
This raises the uncomfortable question: What does the much-hyped industrial upgrade mean for China? Is it all about the relocation of businesses due to rising costs, Shi Anqing, a researcher with the World Bank, asked provokingly.
If so, China's "model" is no more than a travesty of the "flying geese paradigm" that's behind the catching-up process of industrialization of latecomer economies and the cascade of Asian economic take-offs, led by the "head goose" Japan and followed by South Korea, Singapore and some southeast Asian economies.
China finds itself at the end of the gaggle.
Inside China, if we compare its provinces to individual states, the "flying geese paradigm" applies as well - but with caveats. No evidence of genuine industrial overhaul is so far within sight. The void left by Foxconn isn't being filled by more sophisticated replacements. Some local governments simply block suicide news to shield their major revenue contributors from further criticism.
If the vaunted "China Model" cannot even rid itself of the "sweatshop" stain at home, what's the haste about promoting it overseas?
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