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Policy makers place too much trust in science
By Andy Stirling and Alister Scott |
June 9, 2011, Thursday
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WHY do we seem to be witnessing an increasing number of nasty technological surprises? Indeed, this year's Fukushima nuclear disaster in Japan and last year's BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico have taken their place alongside older problems, such as ozone depletion.
We believe that the way in which scientific advice is developed and communicated lies at the heart of the question.
Science is increasingly used to support what are essentially public-policy decisions, particularly concerning new and complex technologies like genetically modified (GM) foods, novel chemicals, and contending energy infrastructures.
Too often, expert opinion is thought most useful to policy makers when presented as a single "definitive" interpretation. As a result, experts typically understate uncertainty. There are two problematic aspects of uncertainty. These arise where we are unsure not just about how likely different outcomes are, but also about which outcomes are relevant.
Examples of such ambiguity arise in fields as diverse as nuclear power, GM food, and the Iraq War. Each is definitely happening (so "probability" is not the problem), but what do they mean? Do they leave the world better or worse? In what senses? What are the alternatives, if any?
Different experts, studies, and organizations adopt contrasting but often equally legitimate and scientifically founded perspectives on these questions.
To try to enforce a single definitive interpretation is deeply misleading, and thus unhelpful - and potentially dangerous - in policy making. Indeed, there can be no guarantee under ambiguity that even the best scientific analysis will lead to a definitive policy answer.
Consequently, fully "science-based decisions" are not just difficult to achieve; they are a contradiction in terms.
No one can reliably foresee the unpredictable, but we can learn from past mistakes. One example is the belated recognition that seemingly inert and benign halogenated hydrocarbons were interfering with the ozone layer. Another is the slowness to acknowledge the possibility of novel transmission mechanisms for spongiform encephalopathies ("mad cow disease").
Dissenting voices
In their early stages, these sources of harm were not formally recognized, even as possibilities. Instead, they were "early warnings" offered by dissenting voices. Policy recommendations that miss such warnings court over-confidence and error.
The key question is how to move from the narrow focus on risk toward broader and deeper understandings of incomplete knowledge - and thus to better scientific policy advice.
In the United Kingdom, the Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee describes its expert advisory process as a "two-way dialogue" - with a priority placed on public accountability. Great care is taken by officials to inform the committee not just of the results of formal analysis by the sponsoring bodies, but also of complex real-world conditions and perspectives.
Reports detail contrasting recommendations by individual members and explain reasons for differences. Why is this kind of approach not normal in scientific advising?
When faced with immeasurable uncertainties, it is much more common for a scientific committee to spend hours negotiating a single interpretation of the risks, even when faced with a range of contending but equally well-founded analyses and judgments, often from different (but equally scientific) fields and disciplines.
As we know from the work of Thomas Kuhn and other philosophers of science, dominant paradigms do not always turn out to be the most accurate. Knowledge is constantly evolving, and it thrives on skepticism and diversity.
(Andy Stirling is research director at Science and Technology Policy Research at the University of Sussex. Alister Scott is a leadership consultant and visiting Ffllow at SPRU. Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2011. www.project-syndicate.org. Shanghai Daily condensed the article.)
We believe that the way in which scientific advice is developed and communicated lies at the heart of the question.
Science is increasingly used to support what are essentially public-policy decisions, particularly concerning new and complex technologies like genetically modified (GM) foods, novel chemicals, and contending energy infrastructures.
Too often, expert opinion is thought most useful to policy makers when presented as a single "definitive" interpretation. As a result, experts typically understate uncertainty. There are two problematic aspects of uncertainty. These arise where we are unsure not just about how likely different outcomes are, but also about which outcomes are relevant.
Examples of such ambiguity arise in fields as diverse as nuclear power, GM food, and the Iraq War. Each is definitely happening (so "probability" is not the problem), but what do they mean? Do they leave the world better or worse? In what senses? What are the alternatives, if any?
Different experts, studies, and organizations adopt contrasting but often equally legitimate and scientifically founded perspectives on these questions.
To try to enforce a single definitive interpretation is deeply misleading, and thus unhelpful - and potentially dangerous - in policy making. Indeed, there can be no guarantee under ambiguity that even the best scientific analysis will lead to a definitive policy answer.
Consequently, fully "science-based decisions" are not just difficult to achieve; they are a contradiction in terms.
No one can reliably foresee the unpredictable, but we can learn from past mistakes. One example is the belated recognition that seemingly inert and benign halogenated hydrocarbons were interfering with the ozone layer. Another is the slowness to acknowledge the possibility of novel transmission mechanisms for spongiform encephalopathies ("mad cow disease").
Dissenting voices
In their early stages, these sources of harm were not formally recognized, even as possibilities. Instead, they were "early warnings" offered by dissenting voices. Policy recommendations that miss such warnings court over-confidence and error.
The key question is how to move from the narrow focus on risk toward broader and deeper understandings of incomplete knowledge - and thus to better scientific policy advice.
In the United Kingdom, the Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee describes its expert advisory process as a "two-way dialogue" - with a priority placed on public accountability. Great care is taken by officials to inform the committee not just of the results of formal analysis by the sponsoring bodies, but also of complex real-world conditions and perspectives.
Reports detail contrasting recommendations by individual members and explain reasons for differences. Why is this kind of approach not normal in scientific advising?
When faced with immeasurable uncertainties, it is much more common for a scientific committee to spend hours negotiating a single interpretation of the risks, even when faced with a range of contending but equally well-founded analyses and judgments, often from different (but equally scientific) fields and disciplines.
As we know from the work of Thomas Kuhn and other philosophers of science, dominant paradigms do not always turn out to be the most accurate. Knowledge is constantly evolving, and it thrives on skepticism and diversity.
(Andy Stirling is research director at Science and Technology Policy Research at the University of Sussex. Alister Scott is a leadership consultant and visiting Ffllow at SPRU. Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2011. www.project-syndicate.org. Shanghai Daily condensed the article.)
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