Two patterns of central-bank governance
Print Edition
The relationship between monetary authorities and governments differs in important ways between the United States and the eurozone. The US invariably falls into a traditional pattern whereby governing politicians, with an eye toward the electoral cycle, tend to favor expansionary fiscal policies and looser monetary conditions, while the Federal Reserve, wary of political pressure, endeavors to assert its independence. If the Fed鈥檚 autonomy were called into question, macroeconomic stability would be jeopardized.
The pattern in the eurozone is the opposite of this. On the whole, fiscal policymakers are hesitant to pursue stimulus even in the face of an economic slowdown (as is the case today), and it is the European Central Bank that ends up trying to pressure others to act.
This inversion of roles between governments and monetary policymakers has no historical precedent.
It has occurred as an unexpected result of the eurozone鈥檚 design, and it now threatens to pose a persistent challenge to the bloc鈥檚 stability.
More broadly, both the US and the eurozone are experiencing symptoms of a crisis of economic governance that has been building for more than 30 years. In the US, the Fed鈥檚 independence is granted by Congress and could in principle be withdrawn, whereas the ECB鈥檚 independence is protected by the Maastricht Treaty.
But this is of little comfort to Europeans, considering that the tension between European monetary authorities and member-state governments could ultimately undermine the consensus in favor of the single currency itself.
As a stateless central bank within a bloc where national governments retain fiscal sovereignty, the ECB has few tools with which to pressure governments to pursue economic policies that are consistent with its inflation target.
At most, the ECB can send a message that when interest rates are zero or negative, fiscal policy is more important than monetary policy for boosting aggregate demand or influencing inflation.
But sovereign states are unlikely to respond to this message unless it happens to be compatible with their own national objectives, which inevitably take precedence over eurozone-wide priorities.
The upshot is that the ECB will continue to be the economic institution of last resort.
In principle, there is a lot more that could be accomplished through monetary policy within the eurozone.
But in practice, for the ECB to do more than it already has would require expanding its remit in controversial and divisive ways. Its policymaking scope would quickly reach a political, if not an economic, limit.
Because the top economic-policy priority in the 1980s and 1990s was to keep inflation in check, central banks were given a mandate that focused squarely on price stability.
It was widely agreed that such a narrow mandate would ensure central-bank independence in the face of political pressure for potentially inflationary policies.
Important 鈥榚xternality鈥
Yet under today鈥檚 conditions of low interest rates, tepid growth, and high risk aversion among investors, the most important 鈥渆xternality鈥 for the eurozone is weak internal demand from larger members such as Germany.
Neither the existing fiscal rules nor the EU鈥檚 framework for coordinating macroeconomic policies can adequately address this problem.
Hence, while the ECB and the European Commission can exercise moral suasion, they cannot actually force a member-state government to pursue fiscal expansion.
And while the Maastricht Treaty protects the ECB from the type of pressure that US President Donald Trump has brought to bear on the Fed, it cannot protect the eurozone from the political divisions that would emerge if the ECB broadened its remit.
The Maastricht Treaty has turned out to be a powerful embodiment of 鈥渉istorical determinism.鈥 When it was signed in 1992, the prevailing economic challenges were quite different from those of today.
The intellectual consensus back then was that fiscal rules and an independent central bank with a narrow mandate were sufficient for macroeconomic stability.
This could not have happened today, when new challenges are leading to a new consensus on both fiscal and monetary policy.
On both sides of the Atlantic, central banks have developed large balance sheets and become 鈥渕arket makers,鈥 and there is a growing need for closer coordination between monetary and fiscal policymaking.
Fiscal policy, on the other hand, needs to be used more actively for demand management.
This calls for an entirely new governance framework, the creation of which will be exceedingly difficult, especially for the eurozone.
Still, there is no other choice, given that ECB independence, although it must be protected, will be insufficient for guaranteeing macroeconomic stability.
Lucrezia Reichlin, a former director of research at the European Central Bank, is Professor of Economics at the London Business School. Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2019. www.project-syndicate.org
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